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Abstract
This paper proposes a new method to evaluate the number of relevant
parties in an assembly. The most widespread indicator of fragmentation
used in comparative politics is the ‘Effective Number of Parties’, designed
in 1979 by M. Laakso and R.Taagepera. Taking both the number of par-
ties and their relative weights into account, the ENP is arguably a good
parsimonious operationalization of the number of ‘relevant’ parties. This
index however produces misleading results in single-party majority situ-
ations as it still indicates that more than one party is relevant in terms
of government formation. We propose to modify the ENP formula by
replacing proportions of seats by voting power measures. This improved
index behaves more in line with Sartori’s definition of relevance, without
requiring additional information (such as policy positions) in its construc-
tion. We thus advocate for the use of our ‘Effective Number of Relevant
Parties’ in future comparative research.
Key words: Voting power indices — Effective Number of Parties — Party
system fragmentation — Relevance — Coalition Formation
1 INTRODUCTION
Attempts at classifying or characterizing party systems for comparative pur-
poses constitute a classical endeavour in the more general comparative study of
democratic political systems. Ever since Duverger (1954) distinguished party
systems on the simple basis of the counting of parties in competition, the numer-
ical criterion has become a widely accepted basis for the comparative description
of party systems (Lijphart 1994 and 1999; Mair 2002). By means of construction
0The second property that emerged in the literature devoted to the comparison of party
systems is the ideological distance that separates the most extreme parliamentary parties
(the degree of polarization, that correlates with the type of party competition -centripetal or
centrifugal- Sartori 1976). This property, that requires more information (ideological place-
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of typologies, scholars have pointed to discriminating features in the compari-
son of democratic polities. But the measurement of how many parties compete
and interact in parliament is needed because the shape of a party system may
be the product of different determinants in a polity or, conversely, may have
broader implications for this polity. Amongst others, scholars have shown that
the shape of the party system is largely determined by the choice of an electoral
system (Duverger 1954; Taagepera and Shugart 1989; Lijphart 1994 and 1999;
Sartori 1997; Cox 1997), that it is also a function of the number of ideological
cleavages present in a polity (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Taagepera and Grofman
1985; Lijphart 1999), that an increase in the number of competing parties can be
seen as a sign of democratization or, in advanced industrialised democracies, of
some form of electoral change like the party dealignment phenomenon (Dalton,
McAllister and Wattenberg 2000). Party systems, on the other hand, determine
the degree of bargaining complexity that may affect government formation and
maintenance (Warwick 1994; Van Roozendaal 1997; Lijphart 1999; Müller and
Strom 2000; De Winter and Dumont 2004).
The Effective Number of parties (ENP) designed by Laakso and Taagepera
in 1979 has become the standard numerical measure for the comparative analysis
of party systems, as it takes both the number of parties and their relative weights
into account to compute a unique variable. It has only recently been challenged
by a number of scholars who showed that this index behaves inappropriately and
thus gives counter-intuitive results under a number of circumstances (Molinar
1991; Taagepera 1999; Dunleavy and Boucek 2003). In this article, we propose
to replace seat shares by voting power indices in the ENP formula. As argued
by Gallagher et al., the power index approach highlights ‘. . . the ways in which
the distribution of bargaining power can sometimes differ quite starkly from the
distribution of seats in the legislature’ (2001: 344), and indeed the power to in-
fluence a decision is not always proportional to a party’s share of parliamentary
seats. These authors, together with De Winter in his recent state of the art in
government formation studies (2002: 186-187), argue that the power index ap-
proach is a promising avenue for research in the field. Through the introduction
of voting power indices, that reflect the potential influence a party may have
in the formation of a majority coalition, we also come closer to Sartori’s defi-
nition of party ‘relevance’. We nevertheless adopt Laakso-Taagepera’s formula
that allows us to give a degree of fragmentation of relevance in competition for
government, rather than an absolute figure of parties considered as relevant for
majority government formation. We also argue that with our Effective Number
of Relevant Parties the most problematic counter-intuitive results of the ENP
disappear. Moreover, there is no need to supplement our index with another
variable to cope with specific circumstances. Finally, no other data on the party
system than those needed for the construction of the ENP are requested.
ments) on the party system than the simple seat distribution amongst parliamentary parties,
is not discussed in the present article.
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2 THEMEASUREMENTOFPARTYSYSTEM
SHAPE
Although the name of Sartori is foremost linked to his seminal typology of party
systems that drew on both numerical and ideological criteria, his defence of the
former type of measure in order to characterize party systems is worth being
recalled:
. . . it does matter how many are the parties. For one thing, the
number of parties immediately indicates, albeit roughly, an impor-
tant feature of the political system: the extent to which political
power is fragmented or non-fragmented, dispersed or concentrated.
Likewise, simply by knowing how many parties there are, we are
alerted to the number of possible ‘interaction streams’ that are in-
volved. . . 2 parties allow for only 1 stream of reciprocal interaction,
. . . 5 parties for 10, . . . 7 parties for 21. . . the indication clearly is
that the greater the number of parties (that have a say), the greater
the complexity and probably the intricacy of the system. . . in partic-
ular, the tactics of party competition and opposition appear related
to the number of parties; and this has, in turn, an important bearing
on how governmental coalitions are formed and are able to perform.
(Sartori 1976: 120)
Hence, a numerical criterion, per se, may capture important features of
party systems. One has however to find what Sartori calls an ‘intelligent’ way
of counting.
One way of characterizing a party system according to a numerical criterion
is to simply count the number of parties that gained seats in parliament. Schol-
ars may also set a threshold under which parties are not considered, but the
problem with this technique is that the definition of level of the hurdle is essen-
tially arbitrary.1 Moreover, even when theoretically justified criteria of ‘party
relevance’ are applied, these methods treat each party —that clears the threshold
or qualifies according to the criteria— equally, whatever their differences in size
or influence in the competition for office.
The simple criterion of the number of parties present in parliament is nev-
ertheless at the heart of the seminal distinction between two-party systems and
multiparty systems made by Duverger (1954). In a refinement of this first clas-
sification, Blondel (1968) looked at both the number of parties and their relative
size to identify two-party systems, two-and-a-half party systems and multiparty
systems including (or not) a dominant party. The main weakness of this new
1Ware (1996) for instance only considers parties that have at least 3 percent of the seats
available in an assembly. The number of parties sharing this property is then called the number
of ’relevant’ parties, a very liberal understanding indeed of Sartori’s concept of ’relevance’ (see
infra).
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classification was that the relative size of ‘half’ and ‘strong’ or ‘dominant’ par-
ties was arbitrarily set (around 10 percent for the former and 40 percent for
the latter, in terms of popular vote). Moreover, the two criteria were treated
separately. The first scholar who proposed a unique index based on both these
variables was Douglas Rae (1967). The idea behind the design of such an index
was that the universe of party system sizes is continuous and that scholars thus
needed a continuous measure rather than setting numerical criteria in order to
identify different classes of party systems. Rae’s index of fractionalization can
be computed using this formula :
F = 1−
X
(si)2
where si is the proportion of parliamentary seats of party i, and
P
stands
for summation (in this case, the sum of all parties’ squared proportions of seats
is taken and subtracted from 1 to provide the fractionalization of parliamentary
parties).2
The more the value of the Rae index comes closer to unit (its maximum
value), the more fractionalized the system is. For instance, when 5 parties get
each 20 percent of the available seats, that is a proportion of 0.2 each, the Rae
index will amount to 0.80, thus indicating a highly fractionalized party system,
as we have to add all five squared proportions of seats and withdraw this result
from 1. If one party gets all the seats, thus getting a proportion of 1, it is
easy to see that the Rae index will point to 0 (its minimum value), indicating
no fractionalization at all in an indeed completely concentrated party system.
Thus, the fractionalization index designed by Rae does summarize important
information about the number of parties and their relative size.
But this index suffers from two major weaknesses. First, Rae’s index does
not follow a linear pattern when the number of tied parties increases, that is,
doubling the number of parties of equal size does not trigger a fractionalization
index twice bigger. For instance, a system with two equal sized parties (at
50 percent each) will amount to a F of 0.50, whilst a system with four equal
sized parties (at 25 percent each) will get a F of 0.75, and, as mentioned above,
a system with five equal sized parties will reach a F of 0.80. This feature is
problematic when we want a phenomenon and its operationalized measure to
follow the same fashion, a quite obvious requirement in scientific inquiry.3The
second problem is linked to the first: even when we simply want to describe
a party system, the Rae index, like most normalized indices, is far from being
easy to interpret as a unique variable characterizing party system.4
2Although most of the classical fragmentation indices may be applied to both measures
at the electoral level (vote shares) and measures at the parliamentary level (seat shares), we
stick to the latter application.
3Using such an index in bivariate or multivariate analyses would trigger flawed results in
terms of relationships between a dependent and one or several independent variables.
4The Rae fractionalization index is nothing else than the complement to unit of the
Herfindhal-Hirschman concentration index (abbreviated HH here), that is not as widely known
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Markku Laakso and Rein Taagepera (1979) transformed this too abstract
fractionalization index into a more intuitive measure that will become widely ac-
cepted in comparative political science, the Effective Number of Parties (ENP).5
The following formula shows how the ENP is computed and its logical link with
Rae’s indices:
ENP = 1P
(si)2
=
1
1− F
using the same notation as above.
Although it simply uses the same information as Rae’s index, the ‘. . . big
advantage of ENP is that it can be visualized more easily as the number of
parties than the Rae abstract index’ (Lijphart, 1994: 69). Taking the example
above, if all five parties of the system get each 20 percent of the votes or seats,
the Effective Number of Parties is exactly 5.00 (F=0.80). When seats are equally
distributed among the parties, the ENP coincides with the raw number of parties
(the maximum value of the index). This means that doubling the number of
equal-sized parties provides an ENP value twice higher, the other requirement
that Rae’s index did not meet. If one party gets more seats than the others, the
ENP will go down, approaching 4.00. This depicts well the situation. A party
system consisting of five parties but with an ENP lower than 5.00 tells us that
some parties are ‘dominated’ by others, that the chances of being necessary in
a majority coalition formation are not equally allocated anymore.
The value given by the ENP can be, and is usually, interpreted in compara-
tive political science as the number of hypothetical equal-sized parties competing
or being influential for the building of a majority government. Taagepera and
Shugart argue that the ENP has become widely used because it ‘usually tends
to agree with our average intuition about the number of serious parties (1989:
80)’. A decade later, one of its designers goes further by stating that the ENP
in political science. The basic idea is the same, that is to give a specific weight —that is not
arbitrary— to the parties according to their size when counting them: the seat shares of parties
determine their own weight, an operation that is done by squaring these proportions (a party
with half the seats will receive a weight of 0.5, so that its value is 0.5×0.5 = 0.25, whilst a
party with 10 percent will have a weight of 10 percent and a value of 0.1×0.1 = 0.01). The
concentration index is then calculated as follows :
HH =
X
(si)2
where si is the proportion of seats for party i.
5Two other indices are sometimes cited in theoretical discussions about indicators of party
system fragmentation, but they were not taken over in many empirical studies. Whereas
in Laakso and Taagepera’s index the shares of votes (or seats) of a party are self-weighting
(by squaring these values), Wildgen’s (1971) index of ‘hyperfractionalization’ accords special
weight to small parties and Molinar (1991) gives more weight to the largest party. Quite
logically, the ENP usually generates values that are smaller than the Wildgen index and
greater than Molinar’s. Although the latter seems at first sight quite attractive as it gives
more intuitive results than the ENP in certain circumstances, it triggers more problematic
counter-intuitive results in others, and is more difficult to compute (Lijphart 1994: 69-70;
Taagepera 1999: 499; Dunleavy and Boucek 2003: 308-13).
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usually comes close to the estimates of Sartori (1976) of the number of ‘rel-
evant’ parties, or at least ‘. . . as close as any operational index based on seat
shares alone can come, without the detailed knowledge about the given country
(Taagepera, 1999: 498)’. He nevertheless acknowledges that the ENP is not
that useful when a single party has more than the majority of seats available in
an assembly, ‘. . .meaning absolute dominance”, as the ENP ‘. . . still indicates a
multi-party constellation (Taagepera 1999: 497)’. In other words, in such situa-
tions, the ENP provides the counter-intuitive result that more than one party is
relevant in terms of majority coalition formation, and thus gives a wrong picture
of how coalition or blackmail potential is distributed. We will show in the subse-
quent sections of this article that, as size in seats is far from always synonymous
to bargaining strength, it is possible to improve Laakso and Taagepera’s index
in its operationalization of Sartori’s concept of party relevance.
Some refinements of the ENP were recently proposed. Taagepera (1999)
himself suggested to ‘supplement’ the ENP in particular situations, through his
‘largest component approach’. His advice is to look at another index when the
ENP is deemed insufficient, that is, in particular when the largest party’s share
is bigger than 50 percent ‘. . . and hence dominates absolutely a crowd of smaller
parties (Taagepera 1999: 497)’. This secondary index, that we refer to here as
the LC (Largest Component) index is the inverse of the share of the largest party.
When this index is inferior to 2.00, this party dominates the party system as its
share is larger than 50 percent, a feature that one could see by simply looking
at the share of the largest party. According to the author, looking at both
indices provides not only an idea of how a party system is fragmented and the
weight of the largest party, but also reduces the possible range of weights for the
second party in the system (1999: 501). It is nevertheless clear that Taagepera
is very cautious in defending the ENP, pointing out that : ‘It should be stressed
that for most purposes ENP alone will do. . . We should not clutter our data
set by including the supplementary index unless it serves a purpose. However,
the secondary index should be available when the need arises (Taagepera 1999:
499)’. We will see below that it is possible to create a unique index that has the
property of taking the value 1.00 —meaning that only one party is relevant in
majority coalition formation, whenever a single-party majority of configuration
exists— thus triggering a more complete measure without loss in parsimony.
More recently, Dunleavy and Boucek (2003) argued that averaging the ENP
score with the LC score yield a unique index that provides more realistic results
than the ENP. Through a comprehensive experimental and empirical account
of how different measures of fragmentation behave with changes in the level of
support of the largest party and the number of parties in competition, they show
that their Nb index gives lower scores than the ENP (their main critique against
the ENP is its over-rating of fragmentation). Although the general technique
they propose in order to evaluate the properties of any fragmentation measure
is certainly worth considering, the gains in using Nb instead of the ENP (or
the ENP and LC) when a party has a share superior to 50 percent are at best
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minimal and in any case not satisfactory. Dunleavy and Boucek seem indeed
content with a maximum Nb score more than half a party less than the ENP’s
maximum score when the largest party has 60 percent. But if what we are
interested in is to correct the ENP when one party has more than a majority
and thus ‘wins’ or dominates the others, having an index score of more than 1.00,
even with a maximum possible value lower than the ENP remains misleading.
As Taagepera himself noted, ‘. . . once a party has more than 50%, how much
does it matter whether it has 53 or 57%? (Taagepera 1999: 502)’, implicitly
reckoning that in any such a situation a fragmentation index should probably
be best set at 1.00.
Siaroff (2003) also presented recently his contribution to the field of party
system characterization. He suggests to go back to the older agenda of the
classification of party systems through the use of numerical indicators.6 Siaroff
argues that adding the shares of the two largest parties provides an index of two-
party seat concentration that is instinctively clearer that the other measures
and that loses very little information in the process of its computation.7 He
nevertheless acknowledges that this measure must be accompanied with another
measure to distinguish between possibly quite different configurations displaying
the same cumulative index result (Siaroff 2003: 271). He thus introduces two
seat ratio measures as measures of competitiveness that complement his first
measure (one indicating the ratio between the share of the largest party and the
second and the other the same ratio but between the second and the third largest
parties.8 From these measures, Siaroff proposes a classification of party systems
where arbitrary scores of different measure discriminate between four types of
party systems, and the combination of his cumulative index and the two ratio
measures specifically helps pointing at two-and-a-half-party-systems. According
to us, this contribution has the main disadvantages of setting arbitrary values
to distinguish party systems and of using several numerical variables —not in a
quite consistent way— instead of a unique indicator.9 As it would be preferable
to compute a single measure for party system fragmentation if we are to use this
indicator in large comparative datasets, we argue that the setting up of such a
unique variable should be aimed at.
6Since the creation of the fractionalization indices and the classic contribution of Sartori
on the basis of both numerical and ideological criteria, the identification of classes of party
systems according to the sole numerical criterion had been almost abandoned.
7Cumulative indices of the like were already introduced by Lijphart (1968) but at the
electoral level (percentage of votes) only. Blondel (1968) even specifically suggested the use of
a cumulative index of the support for the two strongest parties in order to identify different
classes. Sartori (1976: 306-7) however showed that when seat shares were computed instead
of vote shares, the cutting points Blondel had found discriminating for groups of countries
disappeared.
8 Intervals between the first and the second party strengths were already used by Sartori
(1976) in order to identify predominant party systems.
9 It is worth pointing out that the author’s main concern was to find a way to characterize
‘two-and-a-half-party-systems’ and thus customized his research indicators for this specific
end.
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3 INTRODUCINGTHENORMALIZEDBANZHAF
INDEX
In this section, we define the most important notions and concepts related to the
construction of indices in the voting power approach. As argued by Gallagher et
al., this approach highlights ‘. . . the ways in which the distribution of bargaining
power can sometimes differ quite starkly from the distribution of seats in the
legislature’ (2001: 344). Because the power to influence a decision is not always
proportional to a party’s share of parliamentary seats, we propose to replace
seat shares by voting power indices in the ENP formula.
The language used in our subsequent presentation is intended to provide the
most intuitive definition of the different notions necessary to understand what
such indices measure and to indicate the type of contexts in which they can be
applied. In particular, we will concentrate on the index designed by John F.
Banzhaf in 1965, which is aimed at giving the relative power of each voter in an
assembly.10
Assume an assembly with n voters (parties), that may have a different weight
in votes (seats), and a well-defined decision rule (also called quota). This deci-
sion rule determines the total number of votes needed for a proposal of collective
action to be adopted. In general, the simple majority of the available votes is
chosen (n2 + 1), but it may be set at a higher level (some form of qualified
majority). If this quota is not reached, then the proposal is rejected. In such
a weighted voting system where the number of voters is n, the assembly is
denoted N , the weights of voters [1, 2, ..., n] are denoted [w1, w2, ..., wn]. The
voting situation can be summarized by the list :
[q;w1, w2, ..., wn]
with q the quota and w i the number of votes of voter i (which can be any of
the parties present in the assembly, 1 ≤ i ≤ n ) has.
For a given proposal, the subset of voters in N that cast a ‘yes’ vote is
S, and those who cast a ‘no’ belong to NÂS, the complement of S in N . A
subset S of voters voting in the same direction is called a coalition. Without
loss of generality, we thus assume that the members of the coalition S vote in
favour of the proposal at hand. The set 2N represents all the possible coalitions,
including the empty set. The collection of subsets W is the set of all winning
coalitions S such that
P
i∈S wi ≥ q. The set W contains all the coalitions
ensuring acceptance of the proposal. It is common to assume the following :
1. ∅ /∈W
To be winning, a coalition needs members.
10As Felsenthal and Machover (1998) argue, the presentation of this index does not require
recourse to the formal apparatus of cooperative game theory, as this brand of measure was
first designed by Penrose in statistical theory.
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2. N ∈W
The Grand Coalition (that consists of all voters in N , in this case all
voting in the same direction) is always winning.
3. S and T ⊂ N ; if S ∈W and S ⊂ T then T ∈W
Any coalition that contains a winning coalition (and is thus larger than
the latter) must also be winning.
A last condition is usually added to guarantee efficiency of the decision-
making :
4. if S ∈W then NÂS /∈W
This states that a proposal cannot be accepted and rejected at the same
time. When this property is not respected, that is when a coalition (or a voter
on its own) is not winning but can prevent its complement to win, we call it
blocking. This type of coalition cannot enforce a decision on its own, but can
prevent the acceptance of any proposal.
When none of the parties reaches the majority threshold on its own, and the
formation of a coalition is thus needed to attain this quota, the configuration is
called a minority situation. A coalition is said to be minimal winning (MWC),
when all its members are necessary to reach the quota, and thus to enter the
set of winning coalitions W . Stated otherwise, if one of its members leaves the
coalition, the remaining coalition becomes a losing one. In a MWC, all the
members are swings, that is each one can turn the coalition into a losing one by
changing its vote (defecting). If it withdraws its support to the coalition, any
member i swings this MWC into a losing coalition.
i ∈ S ∈W and S\{i} /∈W
There are not only MWC’s in the set of winning coalitions.11 These non-
MWC’s that are nevertheless winning are called oversized coalitions. In over-
sized coalitions, there is at least one member that is not necessary for the coali-
tion to reach the threshold. In a minority situation,12 the Grand Coalition does
not even contain any swing member (except in the special case where a voter
is able, on its own, to block the formation of a winning coalition).13 Oversized
coalitions are thus winning coalitions that either contain no swing member or
only some its members are swings.
A dummy is a voter that is never a swing, or in other words, a voter that
is never able to turn a winning coalition into a losing one. The opposite of the
11Unless we are in a 2-party assembly with equal seat shares.
12 If there is a swing member in the grand coalition, we are dealing with a single-party
situation and this player is a dictator (see infra).
13For instance, in an assembly where 100 seats are distributed amongst n parties but the
largest of these parties has 50 seats, it is a swing in all possible winning coalitions, including
the Grand Coalition. In a 2-party assembly displaying such a feature, both parties are blocking
(because of the 50-50 distribution) and both are thus swings in the Grand Coalition.
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dummy is the dictator, a voter that is a swing in all winning coalitions. When
the weight of the largest party is bigger than the quota, we are thus dealing with
a dictator, as this voter can enforce any decision on its own (all other voters
are thus dummies). We call such type of configuration a single-party majority
situation. If i is the largest voter, then S ∈W for all S 3 i and S /∈W if i /∈ S.
Thereby, the dictator is the only swing voter, as it is the only one that can turn
a winning coalition into a losing one by defecting, and the only possible MWC
is thus the singleton {i}. Notice that in the special case of a blocking voter in a
minority situation, this voter is also needed to form any winning coalition but
cannot enforce a decision on its own. The blocking party must indeed find one
or more partners to reach the quota, and at least one of these partners will also
be a swing. Hence, it is not a dictator as it is not the only swing voter in all
winning coalitions.
We denote the number of times voter i is a swing in all winning coalitions by
ηi. The normalized Banzhaf Index of voter i is the number of times this voter
i is a swing divided by the total number of swing voters. Thus all individual
voters’ β add up to one.
ηiPn
i=1 ηi
= βi
nX
i=1
βi = 1
Hence if i is a dictator, βi = 1, and if i is a dummy, then βi = 0.
In practical terms, in order to calculate the distribution of power in an
assembly, one has to look at the list of all possible winning coalitions and
record for each of these whether voter 1, 2, . . . n is a swing or not. Then the
total number of swings of any voter i is divided by the total number of swings
for all voters in order to provide βi. Summing the shares of power of all voters
should give a result of one.
The normalized Banzhaf index, as well as a number of other well-known
measures of voting power, is part of the class of a priori power indices. This
means that the measure only takes the distribution of resources (generally seat
weights) and the decision rule (the quota, usually set at the absolute majority of
seats available) into account to evaluate each party’s probability of affecting the
outcome of a vote in an assembly. All other potential factors that may influence
of such an outcome (such as preferences, persuasion or negotiation skills, history
of previous interactions, institutional setting, etc.) are abstracted away and thus
all combinations of parties that clear the threshold of the decision rule —those
that form the set of winning coalitions— are considered as equally probable. This
may be either because we do not have reason to believe that certain coalitions
are more likely to form than others or because we do not have accurate data for
inferring a distribution of probabilities. The assumption of equiprobability is
desirable in the former case, and this is what scholars who engage in normative
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studies of constitutional design argue: when the goal is to (re-)design a voting
system,14 it would indeed be inappropriate to look at empirical patterns of roll
calls in order to favour or punish countries that happened to vote more often
with others in the former institutional setting. On the other hand, if we have
an intuition that some factors may well make some coalitions more likely than
others, and that information on those factors is both available and trustworthy,
positive research on the power each party has in an assembly may need the
construction of actual, or a posteriori power indices. More specifically, it is
possible to feed the a priori indices with this pertinent information in order
to weight the probability of a certain type of coalition to form with regard to
another, or simply restrict the number of feasible coalitions according to such
information.15 In any case, as Felsenthal and Machover (2003: 474) recently
argued, a priori voting power is a component of this actual or a posteriori
voting power.
There is another distinction made amongst classes of indices in the voting
power literature. This one concerns the object of the decision taken by the
assembly, and thus relates somehow to the motivation that drives parties in
majority building. The Banzhaf indices are part of the indices that reflect I-
Power, that is ‘power as influence’ over the outcome of a decision.16 These
indices are indeed correctly interpreted as the probability each party has, under
a specified decision rule, in influencing such an outcome (the passing or the
rejection of a vote). This is computed by simply counting the number of times
it is crucial to the building of a majority. As this outcome is not related to a
value, or a structure of payoffs, Felsenthal and Machover (1998; 2001) argue that
indices of I-Power reflect power in a context of competition amongst policy-
seeking parties.17 On the other hand, when a fixed total payoff is specified,
majority building can be seen as a simple cooperative game with transferable
utility and indices reflecting P-Power, or ‘power as a price’ should be used.
These indices, such as the one designed by Shapley and Shubik (1954), reflect
the expectations of parties in terms of share of the payoff to be distributed
(amongst the components of a winning coalition only).18 In this context, parties
14Or an aspect of this voting system. Take for instance the EU Council of ministers in the
wake of the coming enlargement: given the distribution of votes bargained in Nice in 2000, at
what level the decision rule should be set in order to keep the same individual distribution of
voting power amongst incumbent member states before and after this enlargement.
15Different methods that plug preferences in have been presented. See Bilal and Hösli (1999)
or Laruelle and Valenciano (2002) for attributing different probabilities to potential outcomes
and Pajala (2002) for the restriction of the set of winning coalitions to connected winning
coalitions.
16The absolute Banzhaf index, also referred to in the literature as the Penrose-Banzhaf
measure, divides the number of swings a party has by the total number of coalitions (winning
or losing) that party may be part of (thus 2n-1).
17This policy-seeking assumption is quite different than the one commonly understood in
coalition theories drawn from political science. Whilst in the latter it refers to the maximisa-
tion of policy preferences in spatial models, it is here devoid of any reference to expectations
in terms of payoffs based on known policy positions.
18 Instead of looking at all the theoretically possible winning combinations (as in the com-
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are essentially seen as office-driven as they are expected to seek to maximize
their office payoffs.
In the following section, we argue that knowledge of policy preferences is not
necessary for the operationalization of Sartori’s concept of ‘relevant’ party,19 and
that what we need is a reflection of the potential influence of individual parties
on the building of a majority. We thus justify the choice of the normalized
Banzhaf index, an a priori I-Power index, for this purpose.
4 TWOWORLDSCOLLIDE: PARTY SYSTEM
LITERATUREANDTHEVOTINGPOWER
APPROACH
4.1 The normalized Banzhaf index and Sartori’s concept
of ‘relevance’
We have seen that the normalized Banzhaf index is the number of times each
voter is a ‘swing’ when all winning coalitions are considered, divided by the
sum of the total number of swings (thus each time any voter is a swing). In
this section, we show that this index, despite its a priori character, gives an
appropriate measure of what Sartori (1976) calls the ‘relevance’ of parties in a
parliamentary assembly.
The concept of relevance at the heart of Sartori’s typology of party systems
refers to the place a party has in the competition for office in a given system.
Mair (2002: 93) indeed points out that Sartori’s approach ‘. . . helps to focus at-
tention directly on what is perhaps the most important aspect of party systems,
and on what distinguishes most clearly between different party systems: the
structure of inter-party competition, and especially the competition for govern-
ment’. This focus on the competition for government is clear in his definition
of a two-party system: ‘We have a two-party format whenever the existence of
third parties does not prevent the two major parties from governing alone, i.e.
when coalitions are unnecessary. . . ’ and implies that one has to count parties on
the basis of their seat shares because ‘. . . governments are formed, and perform,
on the basis of their strength in parliament (Sartori 1976: 186)’.
putation of Banzhaf indices), the Shapley-Shubik index looks at all theoretically possible
permutations of voters. When one party is a swing and thus turns a losing coalition into a
winning one in a specific sequence of votes, it gets all the payoffs. By computing the swings
of all possible sequences of votes, the index averages out the share of payoffs each party could
expect in a given assembly.
19Without even entering the debate over the quality of existing party policy placements (see
Laver 2001) or pointing at the possible overestimation of the explanatory power of policy-
seeking motivations of parties in coalition formation (see for instance the exclusion of centre
parties in Belgian, Dutch or Finnish governments and even the participation to power of
populist and extreme parties in Italy, Austria or the Netherlands in the last decade).
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According to Sartori, one should look at both the parties that are considered
as having ‘coalition potential’ —are willing to compete for access to government
and are accepted as such by their competitors— and those that have a ‘blackmail
potential’ —those that are either anti-system or not considered fit for government
by other parties but that are able to block the formation of certain coalitions be-
cause of their weight in parliament— in order to assess their relevance in the com-
petition for office in a given party system. Given that the normalized Banzhaf
index of a party is correctly interpreted as ‘what is that party’s probability to
influence the outcome, relative to the other parties present in a given assem-
bly’, political scientists should immediately see the connection between Sartori’s
relevance criteria and this measure aimed at quantifying potential influence.20
Sartori however argued that the relevance of a party ‘. . . is a function not
only of the relative distribution of power —as is obvious— but also, and especially,
of its position value, that is, of its positioning along the left-right dimension’
(1976: 121). Hence, comparative politics scholars like Lane and Ersson (1999:
136) interpret the coalition potential criterion as applying to all, thus even small
parties, of the political centre, and the blackmail potential criterion as applying
to large extremist parties. What the voting power approach teaches us however
is that size does not always equal power, and that smaller parties, whatever
their ideological position, may influence the composition of governments by
preventing some formulas to reach a majority: Gallagher et al. (2003: 344)
take the classic example of a legislature in which two parties win 45 percent of
the seats and a third party the remaining 10 percent. Because of the presence
of a third party, none of the big parties can govern on its own and a coalition
is needed to pass the majority threshold in parliament. If we assume that
parties are more concerned about getting into office than about implementing
a specific policy, any coalition consisting of two parties can form, regardless
of parties’ policy positions. Hence, the smaller party has the same bargaining
power as the two larger ones. Gallagher et al. point to the fact that this is the
type of situation in which Germany was before re-unification. They thus show
that the presence of the smaller Free Democrat Party in most governments can
also be explained without the express recourse to its (median) policy position
in the German left-right party competition. Indeed, what the voting power
approach shows is that the FDP had a disproportionate share of bargaining
power (the same as the two larger parties’ despite its sheer size in seats). Even
20Such a distinction between individual parties’ power to contribute positively to the for-
mation of a majority coalition and their power to destroy it (or in other words, block its
formation) is clearer in the indices designed by Coleman in 1971. The Power to Initiate ac-
tion (I i ) is the number of positive swings of a party (the number of times a party is able to
turn a losing coalition into a winning one), whereas the Power to Prevent action (P i ) is its
number of negative swings (the number of times a party is able to turn a winning coalition
into a losing one). These indices measure parties’ decisiveness conditionally to the outcome
(respectively the formation of a majority coalition or its failure). But both the Coleman in-
dices, when normalized in order to have the sum of individual powers equal to 1, give the
normalized Banzhaf index (and the absolute Banzhaf index of party i is the harmonic mean
of I i and P i ).
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if we had reliable party placements on the main dimensions of competition and
we assumed that parties are policy-seekers, isn’t it the case that even a small
extremist party can constrain the process of cabinet formation? In the example
taken above, not only an extremist party with 10 percent of the seats prevents,
by its mere presence, any single-party majority to form, but it also forces the
two larger parties to form a coalition, as any coalition in which the extremist
party would participate should be erased in the list of feasible coalitions on
ideological grounds. In this case, the presence of a small extremist party in
parliament indeed determines the composition of the coalition, as the coalition
of the two larger parties is the only possible majority formula.17 We argue
that parties that exert such an influence on the process of cabinet formation
should not be discarded, as they display a clear blackmail potential. Hence, if
the blackmail potential18 of a party (that does not qualify under the coalition
potential definition) is not related to its absolute but to its relative strength in
seats, taking the whole distribution of seats into account in order to evaluate
each party’s bargaining power, even small extremist parties qualify for relevance.
The combination of the two criteria for Sartori’s concept of party relevance
and the insights of the voting power approach has an important implication: as
even smaller extremist parties can qualify for blackmail potential, counting the
number of parties without knowledge of ideological positions becomes indeed
a fair operationalization of the number of relevant parties.19 In any case, we
argue that the index we present below comes closer to the number of what
Sartori refers as ‘relevant’ parties than any operational index created without
such a detailed knowledge of a polity.
However, the question of parties that are considered as having ‘coalition po-
tential’ but are not as strong as to be a swing in any winning coalition (what
we refer to as dummies) can be raised, as these will have a normalized Banzhaf
index of zero, indicating that they have no relevance at all. To this potential
objection, we would respond both theoretically and empirically: first, we would
17To be sure, take also the example of a parliament with four parties, ordered alphabetically
from left to right: A has 41 percent of the seats, B has 10, C has 39 and D, which is an extreme-
right party considered unfit for government, has the remaining 10 seats. Only coalitions AB,
AC and ABC are feasible in terms of majority building. Hence, the presence and weight of
D in such a distribution of seats erase any possibility to form a coalition without A (BC does
not reach a majority and BCD is not feasible as D cannot take part in government).
18This example of a system consisting of two large parties and a smaller one, but the
latter considered by the others as unfit for government, closely resembles the Austrian case
in the 1990s. Because of its blocking power, the FPÖ largely determined the composition of
governments, as the SPÖ and ÖVP had to govern together in grand coalitions. In such a
paralyzed system, the populist stances of the FPÖ and the ever more negative incumbency
effect for outgoing coalition partners paved the way for electoral victories of the pariah party
and finally its participation to government.
19 If we accept this demonstration, then no information on policy positions are needed in
order to operationalize the concept of party relevance, as the influence any party may have
in restricting or expanding the number of feasible alternatives for parties competing for office
should be accounted for. Hence, using a voting power index that considers all potential
winning combinations of parties as equiprobable does not seem inappropriate.
14
argue that the concept of relevance, at least in its coalition potential component,
essentially refers to an ‘active’ role in the competition for office. If a dummy
party eventually ends up being part of a government, it is through the will of
other actors that are —contrary to the dummies— crucial to the building of the
coalition, not through its own bargaining strength. It may be because of its
ideological leaning that other parties request its presence, turning a minimal
winning coalition into an oversized one that can then become an ideologically
minimal connected coalition (Axelrod 1970). But this type of governmental
participation for a dummy party owes more to ‘luck’ more than to real ‘power’
(Barry 1980). Moreover, we cannot evaluate a party’s coalition potential unless
we look at other information than the distribution of seats in an assembly. If we
want our indicator to stick as much as possible to the principle of parsimony, we
are thus better off computing relevance through the numerical blackmail poten-
tial parties have. Second, dummies almost never participate in governments: in
a dataset consisting of all the distributions of seats following elections in twelve
west-European parliaments over the full post-war period (1945-1999), and ex-
cluding cases of single-party majorities, there were no dummies included in the
cabinets that were formed directly after these elections (N=163).20 Hence, the
alleged coalition potential of dummies almost never translate in effective par-
ticipation to government (this is mainly due to their sheer seat strength, 2.5
percent on average).
Finally, let us note that the normalized Banzhaf index can also be seen as
operationalizing the concept of ‘credible exit threats’21 or of ‘walk-away values’22
that parties may or may not have when bargaining in coalition formation. The
number of swings parties have can indeed be seen as important resources in the
process of coalition formation, as they can be used to exert threats on the other
actors. If a party is a swing in the coalition formula that is being negotiated,
but has a number of other alternatives in which it can exert the same influence
whilst the other members of that coalition have not, it can use these resources
by credibly threatening to leave the negotiation table if its partners do not give
in to its demands. If the partners have no alternatives (they may be a swing
in the coalition being formed, but not in other winning combinations), they
either give in or join the opposition by letting the powerful party implement
is threat. Having more credible exit threats than others, or, in other words,
having a larger amount of alternatives to turn to when walking away from the
20 In a larger dataset consisting of all cabinets formed in these twelve countries (N=300),
thus accounting for cabinets that form during the inter-election period, only 3 dummy players
out of 101 entered a cabinet. The authors wish to thank Wolfgang Müller, Kaare Strom and
Torbjorn Bergman for allowing them to use this subset of the Coalitions Governance dataset.
21Van Roozendaal 1997 introduces this concept in his study of government duration, and
operationalizes it with the ‘dominance’ certain parties exert on others. In a nutshell, a party
system is dominated whenever the second largest party is unable to form a majority coalition
with the partner(s) that the largest party could choose to form a the smallest majority coalition
in seats it can be part of. In that case, the second party has less evidently at least one
alternative less than the largest in terms of majority building.
22Lupia and Ström 2004 argue that walk-away values are amongst the most important
determinants of the life and death of coalition governments.
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negotiation table is thus an important asset in a bargaining situation. If the
normalized Banzhaf index can be seen as operationalizing these concepts, the
type of information it provides is the relative bargaining power of an individual
party. By applying the formula proposed by Laakso and Taagepera to these
values instead of parties’ seat shares, we argue that we give a more appropriate
picture of how ‘coalition and blackmail potential’, ‘credible exit threats’ or ‘walk-
away values’ are distributed. We will come back to the potential applications
of the Banzhaf index and our ENRP in terms of bargaining complexity in the
discussion at the end of this article, but in the following section we first indicate
how exactly to measure the new index and illustrate how it behaves.
4.2 Measuring the Effective Number of Relevant Parties:
formula and examples
The Effective Number of Relevant Parties present in an assembly is computed
using the following formula :
ENRP =
1P
[βi] 2
where βi is the normalized Banzhaf index for party i, and
P
stands for the
summation over all parties’ normalized Banzhaf indices.
Table 1 shows how our ENRP behaves in a number of party constellations
that are characterized by an Effective Number of Parties of 3.00. These exam-
ples are drawn from the article in which Taagepera suggests to supplement the
ENP with a measure of the largest component (LC) in order to tackle the issue
of single-party majority situations. The first column provides the distribution
of seat shares amongst parties, the second provides the crudest numerical in-
dicator of party systems, that is the number of parties represented, the third
and fourth show respectively Laakso-Taagepera’s Effective Number of Parties
and Taagepera’s Largest Component indicator. The fifth column indicates the
number of ‘relevant’ parties according to Sartori’s definition, as evaluated by
Taagepera (1999). Finally, the last column provides our Effective Number of
Relevant Parties.
16
Party constellations (from P1 to Px) N ENP LC* Relevant 
parties
ENRP
A: 0.33-0.33-0.33 3 3.00 3.00 3 3.00
B: 0.35-0.33-0.32 3 3.00* 2.86 3 3.00
C: 0.39-0.32-0.28-0.01 4 3.00 2.56 3 3.00
D: 0.45-0.29-0.21-0.05 4 3.00 2.22 3 3.27
E: 0.47-0.24-0.22-0.07 4 3.01 2.13 4 2.97
F: 0.48-0.23-0.21-0.08 4 3.00 2.08 4 2.97
G: 0.48-0.32-20 parties at 0.01 22 2.99 2.08 1 or 2 1.00**
H: 0.53-0.15-0.10-0.10-0.10-0.02 6 3.00 1.89 1 1.00
I: 0.55-6 parties at 0.07-0.03 8 3.00 1.82 1 1.00
J: 0.57-21 parties at 0.02-0.01 23 3.00 1.75 1 1.00
Effective Number of Relevant Parties for configurations with constant ENP
(Adapted from Taagepera 1999 : 498)
* LC=Largest component approach (Taagepera 1999). The value of the
index is the inverse of the largest party’s share of votes or seats.
**ENP=2.996
***ENRP=1.004
Configuration A is the classical example that shows that in an assembly
consisting in a number of equally strong (in terms of seats) parties, the ENP
takes the value of this number. Hence, with three parties sharing equally the
number of available seats, the ENP will be 3.00, just like in the case of two
parties owing 50 percent of the seats, the ENP would be 2.00. These cases of
extreme fragmentation constitute the upper bounds of the ENP, but as is shown
by all configurations in the table, many different distributions of seats amongst
three or more parties may give the same ENP value. As soon as the distribution
of seats favours slightly one party over the others, the ENP takes a value inferior
to that of the number of parties receiving seats, just like in configuration B. The
ENRP shares the same desirable (for the sake of its interpretation) constraint
of taking the number of parties as its maximum value when these parties share
power equally (in terms of swings).
On the other hand, there is only one case in which the ENP would be exactly
1.00, that is the lower bound of the index, and that is when one party receives
all the seats. As long as there is more than one party in an assembly, the ENP
will be greater than this overall minimum. Hence Taagepera’s own critique of
the ENP (this critique is furthered at length by Dunleavy and Boucek 2003) in
situations of single-party majority. For instance, although in configurations from
H to J one party has a majority of seats on its own, and can thus enforce all its
preferred decisions, the ENP still indicates a value of 3.00 whereas the number
of relevant parties for majority coalition formation would be 1. This is a rather
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embarrassing result for an index that is supposedly the best operationalization
of Sartori’s concept of relevance without knowledge of party policy positions.
Taagepera’s solution of supplementing the ENP with another indicator for such
types of configurations is not really convincing either, as the LC index only
shows that a party has a majority of seats when it takes a value inferior to 2.00
(again, this index only gives a value of 1.00 when one party gets all the seats
available). Having a continuous measure between 1.00 and 2.00 is however not
appropriate either in such a context, as Taagepera himself implicitly recognized
by remarking that ‘. . . once a party has more than 50%, how much does it
matter whether it has 53 or 57%? (1999: 502, also quoted above)’. Sartori
already had made a major warning against the use continuous measures in the
comparison of party systems.23 According to him, nominal measures have the
advantage of taking thresholds, or turning points, and thus better reflect jumps
from one situation to another. More specifically, Sartori refers to the ‘jump, or
the all-or-none threshold. . . established by the majority principle (1976: 315)’
in the world of voting that is the one assemblies evolve in. He argues that
continuous measures are blind to these jumps present in democratic politics
and thus that they should be accompanied by nominal measures that indicate
whether only one or more parties are needed to reach the majority of seats.
By replacing seat shares by normalized Banzhaf indices in the formula of
the ENP designed by Laakso and Taagepera, we are capable of responding
to this critique on continuous measures, as voting power indices depend on
both the distribution of seats and a decision rule (usually set at the absolute
majority of seats in the context of parliamentary assemblies). They thus reflect
this qualitative jump from a minority configuration to a majority situation.
Specifically, the ENRP we designed has the interesting property of taking the
value 1.00 whenever a single-party majority exists. Hence, the lower bound of
the ENRP will be reached any time a party is a dictator in terms of swings and
not only when one party is a dictator in terms of seats (when no other party
is represented). These situations occur whenever one party has a majority
of seats in an assembly, as it becomes a swing in all majority formula and
renders all parties powerless (dummies), whatever the number of parties owning
seats. Our index thus displays the feature implicitly suggested as desirable by
Taagepera (1999), that is that whatever the strength of the majority in seats
for the largest party, the fragmentation of relevance for majority building is
set at 1.00. Whatever how much the party is majoritarian, the probability of
this party letting a minority forming a government and enforcing decisions is
indeed very small. In case it nevertheless decides to form a surplus coalition
by inviting a dummy party to join government, it retains the absolute power
to revoke this unnecessary partner at any time, leaving the latter a negligible
potential influence on decisions. Hence, such a feature seems pretty reasonable
and makes our index come closer Sartori’s concept of relevance, as shown in
23At the time (1976), it was directed at Rae’s index of fractionalization but the critique
encompasses all indices based on ‘. . . mathematics in actual usage in the social science [as the
latter] is not suitable for handling thresholds (Sartori 1976: 315)’.
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configurations H to J in Table 1.24
How do the different measures reflect how coalition and blackmail potential
are distributed amongst parties indices in the rest of the configurations listed
in Table 1? In configuration C, the fourth party (P4) is a dummy (too small
to be a swing for any winning coalition), leaving all bargaining power to the
three larger parties. As the latter three, despite some differences in seats, have
the same number of swings, the ENRP equals exactly 3.00. From configuration
D to configuration E, the largest party and the smallest party gain seats from
the two middle-sized parties. These increases in seats for P1 and P4 render
possible the formation of a minimal winning coalition P1-P4 that was not fea-
sible in configuration D. Both parties thus gain one swing. But this change in
relative strengths also affects P2 and P3, as in configuration E they are not
swings anymore in the respective winning coalitions P1-P2-P4 and P1-P3-P4.
Only P1 remains a swing in these coalitions, and thus the gap between the
most powerful party and the following widens, a change towards more power
concentration that is reflected in the ENRP but not in the ENP. It is unclear
however why Taagepera estimates that the number of relevant parties is 4 for
both configurations E and F and not for D. He argues that ‘...in F, even the
smallest of the four parties has coalition potential. Ideology permitting, it could
be the largest party’s preferred partner, or it could clinch a majority coalition
that excludes the largest party (1999: 501)’. But the balance of power tips more
in favour of the largest party in F (and E) than in configuration D, indicating
less fragmentation than in D (where the smallest of the four parties already had
coalition potential, although less than in D, as it was a swing in the coalition
excluding the largest party). Hence, more potential coalitions does not trigger
an automatic increase in fragmentation, as the balance of the number of swings
may change dramatically and the largest party may benefit from it. Thereby
our index should —and does— indicate more concentration instead. The example
of D also shows that our ENRP result is not always lower than the value of
ENP.25
The comparison of configurations F and G is more appealing, as the size
of the largest party is the same, and thus so is the LC index. As Taagepera
points out (1999: 501) ‘. . . when political coalition building enters, then cases
F and G look quite different, despite having the same ENP and also the same
LC. . . ’ as with a highly fragmented number of small parties, the largest party
that is very close to the majority threshold can form a coalition and be a swing
in a very large number of coalitions. This is much less the case for the second
24Although calculated on these 10 examples only, the strength of correlation coefficients
between the different indices and the number of relevant parties as evaluated by Taagepera
(and depending on taking 1 or 2 as a value for this variable in configuration G) is around 0.9
for the ENRP, around 0.5 for the ENP and the LC (the latter being more correlated than the
former if the value 2 is taken for configuration G, and the other way round if the value 1 is
taken) and between -0.9 and -0.5 (thus negative) for the crude number of parties.
25 In the comparative dataset referred to above (that excludes single-party majority config-
urations), the value of the ENRP is higher than the ENP in one third of all cases.
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largest party that has to convince no less than 19 of the 20 small parties to
exclude P1 from government. We are thus confident in the result given by our
ENRP, that is very close to 1.00 (1.004), as the power of majority building is
highly concentrated in the hands of the largest party.21 In any case, none of
the measures proposed by Taagepera manages to reflect this major difference
between the two configurations, as he himself acknowledges:
The disappointing surprise is that the same combination of ENP
and LC can hide coalition-building implications as different as those
of cases F and G. What it means is that even the two indicators. . .
jointly cannot always convey all the information we would like to
have (1999: 502).
5 SUMMARY and DISCUSSION
The Effective Number of Relevant Parties operationalizes Sartori’s concept party
relevance by taking advantage of the insights from the voting power literature
and the formula of the fragmentation index designed by Laakso and Taagepera
back in 1979. The latter was up to now rightly considered as the best unique
operational index for comparing party systems without a detailed knowledge of
the polities under study. We showed that the ENP was problematic in single-
party majority situations, in that it still indicates that more than one party is
relevant in terms of government formation, whilst it is clear that such a party
has the power to ensure the enforcement of all its preferred policies without
the others being able to prevent such an outcome. Our ENRP gives a more
accurate picture of the number of relevant parties for building a majority in
this type of configuration. We also explained why and how Sartori’s definition
of relevance might be operationalized without requiring additional information
such as ideological positions of the parties. Moreover, our ENRP provides a
degree of fragmentation of Sartorian party ‘relevance’, and not simply absolute
figures of relevant parties. The two first features derive from our use of the
voting power approach, and the third one from our recourse to a fragmenta-
tion formula. As these improvements of the ENP are not detrimental to the
principle of parsimony in the construction of our index —it does not require new
information nor the adjunction of a second indicator to supplement it in special
cases— and because of its easiness to compute,27 we advocate for its use in future
positive research in the field of comparative politics.
21 Indeed, we would argue that the value 1 (suggested in Table 1 together with the value 2)
should be chosen for the number of relevant parties as estimated by Taagepera according to
Sartori’s definition.
27 It is possible to compute individual power indices as well as fragmentation indices such as
the ENP on line at http://powerslave.val.utu.fi/, a website maintained by Antti Pajala from
the University of Turku, Finland.
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Contrary to Albert’s recent critique (2003)28 we thus argue that voting power
indices can become descriptive and even predictive tools in the context of pos-
itive research. We even showed that a priori power indices may be used to
reflect theoretical concepts more adequately than measures widely endorsed by
empirical scholars in political science. In so doing, they render such concepts
amenable to better empirical tests of hypotheses. We thus have good news for
List, who argues that
. . . voting power might plausibly serve as a regressor in models
of certain empirical phenomena. . . it is conceivable (though still an
untested hypothesis) that voting power might affect decision out-
comes: policies preferred by agents with greater voting power might
prevail more often than ones preferred by agents with less voting
power. Similarly, the distribution of voting power might conceivably
affect the dynamic of decision processes and perhaps the nature of
deliberation in a collectivity (2003: 490).
The index we propose in this article is not only theoretically promising: it
has already been used in empirical studies as reflecting bargaining complexity in
political assemblies and proved to be an important determinant in government
formation (Bäck and Dumont 2003; De Winter and Dumont 2004; Mitchell
2004). It is also a useful indicator for research on the relationship between
electoral and party systems (Dumont, Indridason and Caulier 2004), and one
could think of fruitful applications in public policy analysis as well. Finally,
individual a priori indices have also been recently used by scholars to explain
and predict parliamentary behaviour (Laver and Gianetti 2001; Laver and Kato
2001; Laver and Benoît 2003). Hence, as long as we are cautious in both the
validity of our operationalizations of theoretical concepts and the interpretation
of our results,22 we are convinced of the potential of the voting power approach
for positive research in political science.
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